Responsibility and Lethality for Unmanned Systems:
Ethical Pre-mission Responsibility Advisement by Arkin, Ronald C. et al.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
CSE Technical reports Computer Science and Engineering, Department of
2009
Responsibility and Lethality for Unmanned
Systems: Ethical Pre-mission Responsibility
Advisement
Ronald C. Arkin
Georgia Institute of Technology, arkin@cc.gatech.edu
Alan R. Wagner
Georgia Institute of Technology, alan.wagner@cc.gatech.edu
Brittany Duncan
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, bduncan@unl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/csetechreports
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Computer Science and Engineering, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in CSE Technical reports by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln.
Arkin, Ronald C.; Wagner, Alan R.; and Duncan, Brittany, "Responsibility and Lethality for Unmanned Systems: Ethical Pre-mission
Responsibility Advisement" (2009). CSE Technical reports. 162.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/csetechreports/162
                                                                                                                                                                     Technical Report GIT-GVU-09-01 
Responsibility and Lethality for Unmanned Systems: 
Ethical Pre-mission Responsibility Advisement 
Ronald C. Arkin 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
85 Fifth Street NW 
Atlanta, GA 30308 
1-404-894-8209 
arkin@cc.gatech.edu 
Alan R. Wagner 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
85 Fifth Street NW 
Atlanta, GA 30308 
1-404-894-9311 
alan.wagner@cc.gatech.edu 
Brittany Duncan 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
85 Fifth Street NW 
Atlanta, GA 30308 
1-404-894-9311 
gth656@gmail.gatech.edu 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper provides an overview, rationale, design, and prototype 
implementation of a responsibility advisor for use in autonomous 
systems capable of lethal target engagement.  The ramifications 
surrounding the potential use of operator overrides is also 
presented. The results of this research have been integrated into 
the MissionLab mission specification and demonstrated on a 
relevant military scenario. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The advent of autonomous lethal robotic systems is well 
underway and it is a simple matter of time before autonomous 
engagements of targets are present on the battlefield. We have 
written extensively on this subject [1-3].  This article focuses 
specifically on the issue of ethical responsibility for the use of 
such systems and how an automated human-robot advisor can 
assist in making informed decisions prior to the deployment of 
robotic weaponry. 
This is obviously not without controversy. Sparrow [4] argues 
that any use of “fully autonomous” robots is unethical due to the 
Jus in Bello requirement that someone must be responsible for a 
possible war crime. He argues that while responsibility could 
ultimately vest in the commanding officer for the system’s use, it 
would be unjust to both that individual and any resulting 
casualties in the event of a violation. Nonetheless, due to the 
increasing tempo of warfare, he shares our opinion that the 
eventual deployment of systems with ever increasing autonomy is 
inevitable. We agree that it is necessary that responsibility for the 
use of these systems must be made clear, but do not agree that it is 
infeasible to do so.  
Several existing weapons systems are already in use that deploy 
lethal force autonomously to some degree (e.g., land mines, cruise 
missiles, phalanx system) and they (with the exception of anti-
personnel land mines, due to their lack of discrimination, not 
responsibility attribution) are not generally considered to be 
unethical. He also neglects to consider the possibility of the 
embedding of prescriptive ethical codes within the robot itself, 
which can govern its actions in a manner consistent with the Laws 
of War (LOW) and Rules of Engagement (ROE), thus weakening 
his claim. While Sparrow is “quite happy to allow that robots will 
become capable of increasingly sophisticated behavior in the 
future and perhaps even of distinguishing between war crimes and 
legitimate use of military force”, the underlying question 
regarding responsibility, he contends, is not solvable. It is our 
belief, however, that by making the assignment of responsibility 
transparent and explicit, through the use of a responsibility 
advisor at all steps in the deployment of these systems, that this 
problem is solvable. 
Asaro [5] similarly argues from a position of loss of attribution of 
responsibility, but broaches the subject of robots possessing 
“moral intelligence”. His definition of a moral agent seems 
applicable, where an agent adheres to a system of ethics, which it 
employs in choosing the actions that it takes or refrain from 
taking. He also considers legal responsibility, which he states will 
compel roboticists to build ethical systems in the future. He notes, 
similar to what is proposed here, that if an existing set of ethical 
policy (e.g., LOW and ROE) is replicated by the robot’s behavior, 
it enforces a particular morality through the robot itself. It is in 
this sense we strive to create such an ethical architectural 
component for unmanned systems, where that “particular 
morality” is derived from International Conventions. 
One of the earliest arguments encountered based upon the 
difficulty to attribute responsibility and liability to autonomous 
agents in the battlefield was presaged by Perri [6]. He assumes “at 
the very least the rules of engagement for the particular conflict 
have been programmed into the machines, and that only in certain 
types of emergencies are the machines expected to set aside these 
rules”. We personally do not trust the view of setting aside the 
rules by the autonomous agent itself, as it begs the question of 
responsibility if it does so, but it may be possible for a human to 
assume responsibility for such deviation if it is ever deemed 
appropriate (and ethical) to do so. While he rightly notes the 
inherent difficulty in attributing responsibility to the programmer, 
designer, soldier, commander, or politician for the potential of 
war crimes by these systems, it is believed that a deliberate 
assumption of responsibility by human agents for these systems 
can at least help focus such an assignment when required. A 
central part of the architecture in this article is a responsibility 
advisor, which specifically addresses these issues, although it 
would be naïve to say it will solve all of them. Often assigning 
and establishing responsibility for human war crimes, even 
through International Courts, is quite daunting. 
The elimination of the need for an autonomous agent’s claim of 
self-defense as an exculpation of responsibility through either 
justification or excuse is of related interest, which is a common 
occurrence during the occasioning of civilian casualties by human 
soldiers [7]. Robotic systems need make no appeal to self-defense 
or self-preservation in this regard, and thus can and should value 
civilian lives above their own continued existence. Of course 
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there is no guarantee that a lethal autonomous system would be 
given that capability, but to be ethical we would contend that it 
must. This is a condition that a human soldier likely could not 
easily or ever attain to, and as such it would allow an ethical 
autonomous agent to potentially outperform a human in this 
regard. This is discussed at length in [8]. The system’s use of 
lethal force does not preclude collateral damage to civilians and 
their property during the conduct of a military mission according 
to the Just War Principle of Double Effect1, only that no claim of 
self-defense could be used to justify any such incidental deaths. It 
also does not negate the possibility of the autonomous system 
acting to defend fellow human soldiers under attack in the 
battlefield. 
The overall architecture for this lethal ethical autonomous system 
is described in [8] and is depicted in Figure 1. The architectural 
design must implement these processes effectively, efficiently, 
and be consistent with the constraints derived from the LOW and 
ROE. This article focuses solely on the responsibility advisor that 
forms a part of the human-robot interaction component used for 
pre-mission planning and managing operator overrides. It advises 
in advance of the mission, the operator(s) and commander(s) of 
their ethical responsibilities should the lethal autonomous system 
be deployed for a specific battlefield situation. It requires their 
explicit acceptance (authorization) prior to its use. It also informs 
them regarding any changes in the system configuration, 
especially in regards to the constraint set that encodes the LOW 
and ROE.  In addition, it requires operator responsibility 
acceptance in the event of a deliberate override of an ethical 
constraint preventing the autonomous agent from acting. 
Colin et al [9] note that “as systems get more sophisticated and 
their ability to function autonomously in different context and 
environment expands, it will become important for them to have 
‘ethical subroutines’ of their own… these machines must be self-
governing, capable of assessing the ethical acceptability of the 
options they face” The architectural approach advocated in this 
architecture embodies that spirit, but is considerably more 
complex than simple subroutines. 
2. RESPONSIBILTY ADVISEMENT 
A crucial design criterion and associated design component, the 
Responsibility Advisor, must make clear and explicit as best as 
possible, just where responsibility vests, should: (1) an unethical 
action be undertaken by the autonomous robot as a result of an 
operator/commander override; or (2) the robot performs an 
unintended unethical act due to some representational deficiency 
in the constraint set or in its application either by the operator or 
within the architecture itself. To do so requires not only suitable 
training of operators and officers as well as appropriate 
architectural design, but also an on-line system that generates 
awareness to soldiers and commanders alike about the 
consequences of the deployment of a lethal autonomous system. It 
must be capable of providing reasonable explanations for its 
actions regarding lethality, including refusals to act.  
                                                                 
1 The Principle of Double Effect, derived from the Middle Ages, 
asserts that as long as collateral damage is an unintended effect 
(i.e., innocents are not deliberately targeted), it is excusable 
according to the LOW even if it is foreseen (and that 
proportionality is adhered to).  
 
Figure 1: Ethical Architecture (See [8] for details) 
Certainly the agent should never intend to conduct a forbidden 
lethal action, and although an action may be permissible, it should 
also be deemed obligatory in the context of the mission (military 
necessity) to determine whether or not it should be undertaken. So 
in this sense, we argue that any lethal action undertaken by an 
unmanned system must be obligatory and not solely permissible, 
where the mission ROE define the situation-specific lethal 
obligations of the agent and the LOW define absolutely forbidden 
lethal actions. Although it is conceivable that permissibility alone 
for the use of lethality is adequate, we will require the provision 
of additional mission constraints explicitly informing the system 
regarding target requirements (e.g., as part of the ROE) to define 
exactly what constitutes an acceptable action in a given mission 
context. This assists with the assignment of responsibility for the 
use of lethality. Laws of War and related ROE determine what are 
absolutely forbidden lethal actions; and Rules of Engagement 
mission requirements determine what is obligatory lethal action, 
i.e., where and when the agent must exercise lethal force. 
Permissibility alone is inadequate.   
“If there are recognizable war crimes, there must be recognizable 
criminals” [10]. The theory of justice argues that there must be a 
trail back to the responsible parties for such events. While this 
trail may not be easy to follow under the best of circumstances, 
we need to ensure that accountability is built into the ethical 
architecture of an autonomous system to support such needs.  On 
a related note, does a lethal autonomous agent have a right, even a 
responsibility, to refuse an unethical order? The answer is an 
unequivocal yes. “Members of the armed forces are bound to 
obey only lawful orders” [11]. What if the agent is incapable of 
understanding the ethical consequences of an order, which indeed 
may be the case for an autonomous robot? That is also spoken to 
in military doctrine: It is a defense to any offense that the accused 
was acting pursuant to orders unless the accused knew the orders 
to be unlawful or a person of ordinary sense and understanding 
would have known the orders to be unlawful [12]. 
That does not absolve the guilt from the party that issued the 
order in the first place. During the Nuremberg trials it was not 
sufficient for a soldier to merely show that he was following 
orders to absolve him from personal responsibility for his actions. 
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Two other conditions had to be met [13]: (1) The soldier had to 
believe the action to be morally and legally permissible; and (2) 
The soldier had to believe the action was the only morally 
reasonable action available in the circumstances. For an ethical 
robot it should be fairly easy to satisfy and demonstrate that these 
conditions hold due to the closed world assumption, i.e., the 
robot’s beliefs can be well-known and characterized, and perhaps 
even inspected (assuming the existence of explicit representations 
and not including learning robots in this discussion). Thus the 
responsibility returns to those who designed, deployed, and 
commanded the autonomous agent to act, as they are those who 
controlled its beliefs. 
Matthias [14] speaks to the difficulty in ascribing responsibility to 
an operator of a machine that employs learning algorithms since 
the operator is no longer in principle capable of predicting the 
future behavior of that agent any longer. The use of subsymbolic 
machine learning is not currently advocated at this time for any of 
the ethical architectural components. We accept the use of 
inspectable changes by the lone adaptive component used within 
the ethical components of the architecture, (i.e., the ethical 
adaptor). This involves change in the explicit set of constraints 
that governs the system’s ethical performance. Matthias notes “as 
long as there is a symbolic representation of facts and rules 
involved, we can always check the stored information and, should 
this be necessary, correct it.” We contend that by explicitly 
informing and explaining to the operator of any changes made to 
the ethical constraint set by the reflective activities of the ethical 
adaptor prior to the agent’s deployment on a new mission, and 
ensuring that any changes due to learning do not occur during the 
execution of a mission, an informed decision by the operator can 
be made as to the system’s responsible use. Matthias concludes 
that “if we want to avoid the injustice of holding men responsible 
for actions of machines over which they could not have sufficient 
control, we must find a way to address the responsibility gap in 
moral practice and legislation.” In any case, the responsibility 
advisor is intended to make explicit to the operator of an ethical 
agent the responsibilities and choices he/she is confronted with 
when deploying autonomous systems capable of lethality. 
Responsibility acceptance occurs at multiple levels within the 
architecture: 
1. Command authorization of the system for a particular 
mission. 
2. Override responsibility acceptance. 
3. Authoring of the constraint set that provides the basis for 
implementing the LOW and ROE, which entails 
responsibility – both from the ROE author and by the 
diligent translation by a second party into a machine 
recognizable format. It should be noted that failures in the 
accurate description, language, or conveyance of the ROE to 
a soldier have often been responsible or partially responsible 
for the unnecessary deaths of soldiers or violations of the 
LOW [15]. Great responsibility will vest in those who both 
formulate the ROEs for lethal autonomous systems to obey, 
and similarly for those who translate them into machine 
usable forms. Mechanisms for verification, validation, and 
testing must be an appropriate part of any plan to deploy 
such systems. 
4. Verification that only military personnel are in charge of the 
system. Only military personnel (not civilian trained 
operators) have the legal authority to conduct lethal 
operations in the battlefield. 
The remainder of this section focuses primarily on two aspects of 
responsibility assignment: authorizing a lethal autonomous 
system for a mission, and the use of operator controlled overrides. 
2.1   Command Authorization 
Obligating constraints provide the sole justification for the use of 
lethal force within the ethical autonomous agent. Forbidding 
constraints prevent inappropriate use, so the operator must be 
aware of both, but in particular, responsibility for any mission-
specific obligating constraints that authorize the use of lethality 
must be acknowledged prior to deployment. Klein [16] identifies 
several ways in which accountability can be maintained for armed 
UVs: 
1. “Kill Box” operations, where a geographic area is designated 
where the system can release its weapons after proper 
identification and weapon release authority is obtained. 
2. Targets located and identified prior to an unmanned vehicle 
(UV) arriving on scene. Once on scene, the UV receives 
target location and a “clear to fire” authorization. 
3. “Command by Negation”, where a human overseer has 
responsibility to monitor targeting and engagements of a UV 
but can override the automated weapons systems. 
Our approach within the ethical architecture differs in several 
respects. Kill box locations must be confirmed in advance of the 
mission as part of the ROE and are encoded as constraints. 
Candidate targets and target classes must be identified in advance, 
and must also be confirmed by the system during the operation 
itself prior to engagement. Permission-to-fire is granted during the 
mission in real-time if obligating constraints require, not simply 
upon arrival at the scene. This use of obligatory constraints, 
derived from the ROE, assists in the acceptance of responsibility 
for the use of lethal action by the operator, due to transparency 
regarding what the system is permitted to achieve with lethal 
force. To establish this responsibility, prior to deployment the 
operator must acquire and acknowledge possessing an explicit 
understanding of the underlying constraints that determine how 
lethality is governed in the system. In addition to advanced 
operator training, this requires making clear, in understandable 
language, exactly which obligations the system maintains 
regarding its use of lethal force for the given mission and 
specifically what each one means. These explanations must 
clearly demonstrate that:  
• Military necessity is present and how it is established 
• How combatant/target status is determined 
• How proportional response will be determined relative to a 
given threat 
The operator is required to visually inspect every single 
obligating constraint in the architecture’s short-term memory 
(STM) prior to mission deployment, understand its justification, 
and then acknowledge its use. This results in responsibility 
acceptance. The user interface must facilitate and support this 
operation. The implications of LOW and ROE-derived constraints 
that reside in long-term memory (LTM) must be conveyed to the 
operator earlier through qualification training for use of the 
system in the field prior to actual deployment. Any changes in 
LTM constraint representations that occur after training must be 
communicated to the operator in advance of use, and 
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acknowledgment of the understanding of the consequences of 
these changes accepted in writing. 
The results of previous experience and/or the consultations of 
expert ethicists regarding similar previous mission scenarios can 
also be presented to the operator for review. This can help ensure 
that mistakes of the past are not repeated, and that judgments 
from ethical experts are included in the operator’s decision 
whether or not to use the lethal autonomous system in the current 
context, effectively providing a second or third opinion prior to 
use. 
2.2  Design for Mission Command 
Authorization 
Several architectural design features are necessary for mission 
authorization. They involve a method to display the mission’s 
active obligating constraints and to allow the operator to probe to 
whatever depth is required in order to gain a full understanding of 
the implications of their use, including expert opinion if 
requested. This interface must: 
1. Require acknowledgment that the operator has been properly 
trained for the use of an autonomous system capable of lethal 
force, and understands all of the forbidding constraints in 
effect as a result of their training. It must also confirm the 
date of their training and if any updates to forbidding 
constraints in LTM have occurred since then to ensure he/she 
is aware of and accepts them. 
2. Present all obligations authorizing the use of lethal force by 
providing clear explanatory text and justification for their 
use at multiple levels of abstraction. The operator must 
accept them one by one via a checkbox in order to authorize 
the mission. 
3.  Recall previously stored missions (both human and 
autonomous) and their adjudged ethical appropriateness, as 
obtained from expert ethicists. This may require additional 
operator input concerning the location, type, and other 
factors regarding the current mission, beyond the existing 
ROE constraint set. These results must be presented in a 
clear and unambiguous fashion, and the operator must 
acknowledge having read and considered these opinions. 
4. A final authorization for deployment must be obtained. 
The system is now ready to conduct its mission, with the operator 
explicitly accepting responsibility for his role in committing the 
system to the battlefield.  
2.3 The Use of Ethical Overrides 
Walzer [10] recognizes four distinct cases regarding the Laws of 
War and the theory of aggression: 
1. LOW are ignored under the “pressure of a utilitarian 
argument.” 
2. A slow erosion of the LOW due to “the moral urgency of the 
cause” occurs, where the enemies’ rights are devalued and 
the friendly forces’ rights are enhanced. 
3. LOW is strictly respected whatever the consequences. 
4. The LOW is overridden, but only in the face of an 
“imminent catastrophe.” 
It is our contention that autonomous robotic systems should 
adhere to case 3, but potentially allow for case 4, where only 
humans are involved in the override. By purposely designing the 
autonomous system to strictly adhere to the LOW, this helps 
scope responsibility, in the event of an immoral action by the 
agent. Regarding the possibility of overriding the fundamental 
human rights afforded by the Laws of War, Walzer notes:  
“These rights, I shall argue, cannot be eroded or undercut; 
nothing diminishes them, they are still standing at the very 
moment they are overridden: that is why they have to be 
overridden.… The soldier or statesman who does so must be 
prepared to accept the moral consequences and the burden of 
guilt that his action entails. At the same time, it may well be that 
he has no choice but to break the rules: he confronts at last what 
can meaningfully be called necessity.”[10] 
This ability and resulting responsibility for committing an 
override of a fundamental legal and ethical limit should not be 
vested in the autonomous system itself. Instead it is the province 
of a human commander or statesman, where they must be duly 
warned of the consequences of their action by the autonomous 
agent that is so instructed. Nonetheless, a provision for such an 
override mechanism of the Laws of War may perhaps be 
appropriate in the design of a lethal autonomous system, at least 
according to our reading of Walzer, but should not be easily 
invoked and must require multiple confirmations in the chain of 
command before the robot is unleashed from its constraints.   
In effect, the issuance of a command override changes the status 
of the machine from an autonomous robot to that of a robot 
serving as an extension of the warfighter, and in so doing the 
operator(s) must accept all responsibility for their actions. These 
are defined as follows [17]: 
• Robot acting as an extension of a human soldier: a robot 
under the direct authority of a human, especially regarding 
the use of lethal force. 
• Autonomous robot: a robot that does not require direct 
human involvement, except for high-level mission tasking; 
such a robot can make its own decisions consistent with its 
mission without requiring direct human authorization, 
especially regarding the use of lethal force. 
If overrides are to be permitted, they must use a variant of the 
two-key safety precept, (DSP-15 from [18]) but slightly modified 
for overrides: The overriding of ethical control of autonomous 
lethal weapon systems shall require a minimum of two 
independent and unique validated messages in the proper 
sequence from two different authorized command entities, each of 
which shall be generated as a consequence of separate authorized 
entity action. Neither message should originate within the 
unmanned system launching platform. 
The management and validation of this precept is a function of the 
responsibility advisor. If an override is accepted, the system must 
generate a message logging this event and transmit it to legal 
counsel, both within the U.S. military and to International 
Authorities. Certainly this will assist in making the decision to 
override the LOW a well-considered one by an operator, simply 
by the potential consequences of conveying immediately to the 
powers-that-be news of the use of potentially illegal force. This 
operator knowledge enhances responsibility acceptance for the 
use of lethal force, especially when unauthorized by the ethical 
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architecture.  
The ethical architecture serves as a safety mechanism for the use 
of lethal force. If it is removed for whatever reason, the operator 
must be advised of the consequences of such an act. The system 
should still monitor and expose any ethical constraints that are 
being violated within the architecture to the operator even when 
overridden, if it is decided to use lethality via this system bypass. 
The autonomous system can still advise the operator of any 
ethical constraint violations even if the operator is in direct 
control (i.e., by setting the Permission-To-Fire variable to TRUE, 
enabling the weapons systems). If such ethical violations exist at 
the time of weapons deployment, a “two-trigger” pull is advised, 
as enforced by the autonomous system. A warning from the 
system should first appear that succinctly advises the operator of 
any perceived violations, and then and only then should the 
operator be allowed to fire, once again confirming responsibility 
for their action by so doing. These warnings can be derived 
directly from the forbidden constraints while also, if appropriate, 
providing a warning that there is no obligation to fire under the 
current mission conditions, i.e., there exists no obligating 
constraint that is TRUE at the time. 
When these constraints are added, either in LTM or STM, the 
developer must assume responsibility for the formulation of that 
constraint and its ethical appropriateness before it can be used 
within a fielded system. Normally this would occur through a 
rigorous verification and validation process prior to deployment. 
The basic research conducted in this effort, is intended to be proof 
of concept only, and will not necessarily create constraints that 
completely capture the requirements of the battlefield or are 
intended in their current form for that purpose. 
2.4  Design for Overriding Ethical Control 
Overriding means changing the system’s ability to use lethal 
force, either by allowing it when it was forbidden by the ethical 
controller, or by denying it when it has been enabled. As stated 
earlier, overriding the forbidding ethical constraints of the 
autonomous system should only be done with utmost certainty on 
the part of the operator. To do so at runtime should require a 
direct “two-key” mechanism, with coded authorization by two 
separate individuals, ideally the operator and his immediate 
superior. This operation is generally not recommended and, 
indeed it may be wise to omit it entirely from the design to ensure 
that operators do not have the opportunity to violate the Laws of 
War. In this way the system can only err on the side of not firing. 
The inverse situation, denying the system the ability to fire, does 
not require a two-key test, and can be done directly from the 
operator console. This is more of an emergency stop scenario, 
should the system be prepared to engage a target that the operator 
deems inappropriate for whatever reasons. 
The functional equivalent of an override is the negation of the 
PTF (Permission-To-Fire) variable that is normally directly 
controlled by the ethical architecture. This override action allows 
the weapons systems to be fired even if it is not obligated to do so 
(F → T) potentially leading to atrocities, or eliminating its 
obligated right to fire if the operator thinks it is acting in error (T 
→F). This is accomplished through the use of the exclusive OR 
function. Table 1 captures these relationships. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Logical values for the Permission-to-fire (PTF) 
variable. 
 Governor 
PTF 
Setting 
Operator 
Override 
Final 
PTF 
Value 
Comment 
1 F  (do not 
fire) 
F     (no 
override) 
F 
(cannot 
fire) 
System does not fire 
as it is not overridden 
2 F  (do not 
fire) 
T 
(override) 
T  (can 
fire) 
Operator commands 
system to fire despite 
contrary ethical 
recommendations  
3 T (perm. 
to fire) 
F   (no 
override) 
T  (can     
fire) 
System is obligated to 
fire 
4 T (perm. 
to fire) 
T 
(override) 
F 
(cannot 
fire) 
Operator negates 
system’s permission 
to fire 
In case 2, using a graphical user interface (GUI), the operator 
must be advised and presented with the forbidden constraints 
he/she is potentially violating. Each violated constraint is 
presented to the operator with an accompanying text explanation 
for the reasoning behind the perceived violation and any relevant 
expert case opinion that may be available. This explanation 
process may proceed, at the operator’s discretion, down to a 
restatement of the relevant Laws of War if requested. The 
operator must then acknowledge understanding each constraint 
violation and explicitly check each one off prior to an override for 
that particular constraint being rescinded. One or more constraints 
may be removed by the operator at their discretion. After the 
override is granted, automated notification of the override is sent 
immediately to higher authorities for subsequent review of its 
appropriateness.  
Similarly in case 4, the operator must be advised and presented 
with the ROE obligations she/he is neglecting during the override. 
One or all of these obligating constraints may be removed. As 
case 4 concerns preventing the use of force by the autonomous 
system, the operator can be granted instantaneous authority to set 
the Permission-to-Fire value to FALSE, without requiring a prior 
explanation process, a form of emergency stop for weapon 
release. 
3. IMPLEMENTING THE 
RESPONSIBILTY ADVISOR 
The responsibility advisor is currently partially implemented as 
part of the MissionLab behavior specification system [19]. 
MissionLab provides automated pre-mission planning functions to 
specify detailed mission objectives for the operator to utilize. The 
user interacts through a design interface tool (the configuration 
editor) that permits the visualization of a mission specification as 
it is created. The responsibility advisor serves as a gatekeeper to 
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the mission specification system, preventing unauthorized mission 
creation as well as counseling users regarding the mission’s 
obligations and prohibitions. The operation of the pre-mission 
responsibility advisor occurs in five steps: 
1. Determine if the user is authorized to conduct the mission 
and when they were trained. If they are authorized, then: 
2. The user selects a mission. 
3. The user is presented with plain text descriptions of their 
mission obligations including related information. If they 
accept these obligations, then: 
4. Present the user with a plain text description of any 
prohibitions that have changed since their training including 
related information. If they accept these prohibitions, then: 
5. Present final authorization for the mission. 
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H
om
an-R
obot Interface
Pre-mission Planning
Operator Commander or/and 
Relevant Personnel
G
IG
H
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H
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an-R
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Figure 2. Architectural diagram for the authorization step 
(step 1). The operator submits login and training information 
which the responsibility advisor sends to the GIG for 
verification. 
The first step requires the user to enter their name, military ID 
number, and date of their latest training. This information is sent 
to a surrogate Global Information Grid (GIG) for verification of 
user provided information [20]. The surrogate GIG was 
implemented as a stand-alone server. Figure 2 depicts the 
architecture and Figure 3 displays a screenshot for this step.  
Next the user selects a mission from the list of potential missions 
in the CBR library. This list of missions is provided by an 
authorized commander or other relevant personnel. At this stage 
the user can use several dimensions to compare the mission to 
other potential missions, can review the mission summary and 
history, or select the mission for deployment. Figure 4 depicts 
architecture for this step and Figure 5 displays a screenshot for 
this step. 
 
Figure 3. The login screen for the responsibility advisor. The 
user entered information is validated by the GIG. 
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Figure 4. Architectural diagram for the mission selection step. 
As depicted, the robot retrieves mission information from the 
CBR library. The retrieved missions have already been 
authorized by a superior officer. 
Once the mission has been selected, features of the mission are 
used as a probe to retrieve the mission’s obligations. Obligations 
are presented to the user one at a time. The user can proceed by 
clicking the next box stating that they are aware of and familiar 
with each obligation. After review of an obligation, the user is 
presented with information related to the obligation. This 
information consists of relevant case studies from news events 
highlighting the ethical aspects of the obligation. Each piece of 
related information contains an in-depth description, a summary 
of the event, the applicable laws of war, and a relevance rating. 
The related information is meant to aid the operator’s 
understanding of their mission obligations. Figure 6 depicts the 
architecture and Figure 7 displays a screenshot. 
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Figure 5. The mission selection screen. The user can choose 
the mission that is most suited for the task. Mission details 
and simulation-based rehearsal are also possible. All available 
missions are assumed to have been prescreened by the user’s 
commander. 
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Figure 6. Architectural diagram for obligation and 
prohibition, or mission constraint, retrieval. The operator 
must confirm that they have read and understood each 
obligation and prohibition. Each mission constraint is 
retrieved until all constraints have been reviewed by the user. 
 
Figure 7. The screen details a user obligation. Obligations 
must be reviewed and accepted. Obligations are listed serially. 
Background information is provided in the screen that follows 
(not shown). 
Once the user has reviewed and acknowledged each obligation for 
the mission, the system then presents the user with any 
prohibitions that have changed or been added since their training 
date. Each prohibition must be reviewed and is accepted by 
clicking the next box. After review, related information is 
presented to the user for their perusal. The interface for the review 
of prohibitions and related information is similar to the interface 
for the review of obligations.     
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Figure 8. This final architectural diagram depicts the transfer 
for the obligations and prohibitions to the ethical governor for 
execution and the commencement of the mission by the 
operator. 
 
Figure 9. Final authorization screen. The user can now accept 
final responsibility for the mission by type their name in the 
screen’s white space. 
In the final step (Figs. 8 and 9), the user is advised that they have 
received authorization to conduct the mission. They must type 
their name to accept responsibility for the conduct of the mission. 
The responsibility advisor passes the obligations and prohibitions 
on to the ethical governor [8].   
4. FEASIBILTY EXPERIMENT 
A feasibility experiment was conducted to determine if the system 
successfully advised users of all the mission’s obligations and 
prohibitions. In the experiment, an experimenter acted as a naïve 
user attempting to logon to the system and perform a mission. 
Two different styles of mission were constructed to reflect real 
world scenarios. The first scenario, titled “Taliban Muster in 
Cemetery” re-enacts an event that was reported by the associated 
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press on September 14, 2006 [21]. In this scenario, enemy 
combatants have assembled at a location determined to be a 
religious or cultural object. Although the system successfully 
discriminates the targets, and determines that weapons are 
appropriate for the target, the LOW dictate that since the targets 
are located within a cultural property they should not be attacked. 
With this real-life event serving as ground truth, the responsibility 
advisor successfully informs the user that they are obligated to 
fire on targets but are prohibited from firing on targets located 
near cultural property (Fig. 10).      
In contrast to the first scenario, the second scenario re-enacts an 
event which likely violated ethical battlefield conduct. This 
scenario, based on the video footage “Apache Rules the Night,” 
witnesses insurgents deploying an improvised explosive device. 
An Apache helicopter fires on three combatants, killing two and 
wounding one. The pilot is then instructed to kill the wounded 
man, before destroying the remaining truck. This scenario 
involves several potential violations of the Laws of War 
including, injury after surrender, killing of prisoners, and search 
for casualties. For this scenario, the responsibility advisor 
successfully advises the user of their obligations related to POWs 
and the Laws of War in the event that an unmanned aerial vehicle 
is deployed on a similar mission, to ensure that such an event does 
not reoccur.      
 
Figure 10. Mission operation area for the Taliban Muster in 
the Cemetery scenario is depicted. The simulated cemetery 
depicted to the right (green) and the muster is depicted to the 
left (red).   
Ongoing experiments continue to explore the impact of the 
responsibility advisor on user decisions. These experiments will 
attempt to determine if use of the responsibility advisor results in 
increased adherence to the Laws of War and Rules of Engagement 
compared to unadvised users.  
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper described the basis, motivation, architecture and 
implementation of a prototype ethical responsibility advisor for 
use in unmanned systems capable of lethal force. It is possible 
that this advisor can be used for tele-operated robotic systems as 
well, although that is not the current focus of this research. It is a 
component of a much larger architecture described in detail in [8]. 
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